






INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND POLICE 
MISSIONS TO THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
AND THEIR ROLE IN STABILIZING 
MACEDONIAN ‑ALBANIAN RELATIONS
After the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the out-
break of conflicts related to that process the international diplomacy decided 
to introduce military missions, of various nature, in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, that is former Yugoslavian republics, where a war was waged in the 
first half of the 1990s. The Republic of Macedonia declared independence al-
ready in 1991, but it became independent peacefully; it did not mean, however, 
that the country was free from internal problems, for instance of ethnic nature, 
which escalated before the end of the twentieth century putting the Macedonian 
state on the brink of civil war on the eve of the new century. The escalation ne-
cessitated the invitation by the state authorities of international military mis-
sions to assist in stabilising the country’s internal situation.
Key -words: Macedonia, national minorities in Macedonia, military operations, 
international police operations, the Ohrid agreement, Macedonian -Albanian 
conflict
INTRODUCTION
Conflicts and wars in the Balkans, which began after the demise of the Yugoslavian 
state in the early 1990s, were of a multidimensional nature, so international diplomacy 
and organizations needed to show high flexibility and use non -standard methods in 
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solving crisis situations which were superimposed to create a tragic picture of the wars 
and conflicts, the impact of which can still be seen in the internal situation of the coun-
tries that emerged from Yugoslavia.
The Republic of Macedonia1 declared independence as early as 1991, after the 
Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia. Macedonia was able to avoid its 
war fate, but this does not mean that it avoided problems with which republics of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had to struggle. What is more, neither 
did it avoid the international involvement of diplomats and organizations nor military 
and police operations which were carried out for a dozen or so years (1992–2005). 
The UN, then NATO, and finally EU forces were stationed in the country. In the 
1990s, the security of the Macedonian -Serbian border2 was high on the agenda in view 
of the need to respect the embargo imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at 
that time, as well as the aggravation of the conflict between Serbia and Albania. This 
might have led to an escalation of violence and the problem spreading to the territory 
of Macedonia for demographic reasons. All the more so that Macedonian Albanians 
took some more or less serious initiatives for the independence of the Macedonian ter-
ritory they inhabited.3
In view of the above, it is hard to believe that until late 1990 the Macedonian state 
was not perceived as an area at risk of ethnic conflict, though the Constitution and 
regulations of the situation of national and ethnic minorities were far from satisfac-
tory to the Albanian minority, and this was reflected in the emergence of the above-
-mentioned initiatives. The Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 mentioned Macedonia as 
a country which had implemented reforms necessary to achieve rapid economic develop-
ment. In February 1999, the UN peace mission came to an end, but in March that 
year the war in Kosovo broke out. This directly affected Macedonia’s internal situation 
and might have led to the destabilization of this relatively small country. Indeed, the 
conflict spread into Macedonian territory but the efforts of western diplomacy pre-
vented its escalation. NATO was entrusted with the task to ensure stability. Later the 
European Union replaced NATO in performing this mission, and soon ended the mili-
tary operation, supporting public order through the police mission which continued 
until the end of 2005.4
1 The country’s official, internationally recognised name reads: the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), but 120 states – including Poland – acknowledged the name: Republic of 
Macedonia. On 8th April 1993 Macedonia was accepted as a member of the UN, the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE.
2 From 1992 to 2003 Serbia, along with Montenegro, were parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
3 Among Albanian initiatives one can mention: the referendum in 1992 on the Albanian Republic of 
Illyria; attempts at the armed destabilization of the country in 1993, the conflict about the university 
in Tetovo in the mid -1990s or the flag crisis of 1997. See: M. Dymarski, ‘Macedonia a narodowe aspi-
racje Albańczyków w XX wieku’ in I. Stawowy -Kawka, M. Kawka (eds.), Macedoński dyskurs niepodle-
głościowy. Historia, kultura, literatura, język, media, Kraków 2011, p. 219; D. Stoilovski, La République 
de Macédoine dans le relations internationales, 1991 -1998, Štip 1999, pp. 25, 91.
4 See: M. Donevska, ‘Approaches to Social Problem Solving in the Republic of Macedonia during the 
Period of System Transformation’ in M. Niezgoda (ed.), The Consequences of Great Transformation: 
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The aim of the present paper is to present the nature and level of international in-
volvement through military and police missions on the territory of the Macedonian 
state, as well as to assess whether they were successful. The main research question is: 
did international involvement contribute to the improvement and stability of relations 
between Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians?
THE UN PEACE MISSION
The goal of the UN peace missions is to ensure international peace and stability. 
However, the problem is that such operations may take place in any part of the world 
where they can encounter various kinds of conflicts and different cultural contexts 
which calls for dynamic operations and flexibility to react to the situation. The basic 
areas for UN peace missions are as follows:




In line with these objectives, conflict prevention, mediation and peace -building
activities were carried out in Macedonia. Further activities under NATO and later 
EU operations followed the same objectives. The United Nations Protection Force – 
UNPROFOR6 were deployed in the Republic of Macedonia in early 1993, upon the 
request of President Kiro Gligorov and after a UN reconnaissance mission at the turn 
of November/December 1992. Their task was to ensure the country’s stability and se-
curity by monitoring the borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania. 
There were a few elements which might have raised instability along the border zone: 
with the risk that Serbs might have occupied a part of the Macedonian state (Serbs ac-
counted for ca. 2% of the Republic of Macedonia’s population, living in its northern 
areas7), in particular after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army. It was not 
exclusively about the possibility of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
but perhaps Serbian paramilitary organisations, playing a major role during the war in 
Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, significantly influencing the situation.8 Belgrade’s 
Polish and Macedonian Experiences. Transactions of VII Cracow -Skopje Sociological Seminar, Cracow, 
18 -20 September 2002, Kraków 2004, pp. 103, 108 -109; D. Stoilovski, La République de Macédoine…, 
pp. 19, 21, see also: P. Olszewski, Stosunki Macedonii z Unią Europejską. Starania o członkostwo, Lublin 
2009, p. 12 (Prace Instytutu Europy Środkowo -Wschodniej, 8).
5 ‘Misje pokojowe ONZ’, UNIC Warsaw. Ośrodek informacji ONZ w Warszawie, December 2012, at 
<http://www.unic.un.org.pl/misje_pokojowe/globalne_bezpieczenstwo.php>, 22 November 2013.
6 UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force.
7 See: I. Stawowy -Kawka, Historia Macedonii, Wrocław 2000, p. 302.
8 The political leader of the Serbian Radical party and the White Eagles (Beli Orlovi, Osvetnici, 
Četnici) paramilitary groups Vojislav Šešelj instigated incidents in northern Macedonia even before 
the war. Ibid., p. 294.
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political attempts, aimed at partitioning the Macedonian state between the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and Greece, should also not be ignored. Other factors might 
include the smuggling of goods into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which resulted 
in the UN imposing an embargo that was successively extended, as well as the above-
-mentioned situation of the Albanian minority which accounted for approx. 25%9 of 
Macedonia’s population, living in Serbian (within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) 
and Macedonian areas. In the years 1991–1995 international diplomacy was engaged 
in trying to bring the wars in Croatia and Bosnia to an end, but the appeals and en-
deavours of the Albanians did not go unnoticed. What is more, the situation of the 
Macedonian Albanians was far from satisfactory, and they expressed their concerns in 
the first half of the 1990s. Their frustration grew until the end of the 20th century. 
The Macedonians were aware that a contingent consisting of 500 people10 would not 
be able to defend their country, but the very presence of the UN forces was expected to 
safeguard stability and peace.11
On 31 March 1995, by virtue of the Security Council’s resolution S/RES/983, the 
UN mandate was transformed into three separate missions to the three republics.12 It 
was caused by the fact that despite everything their tasks were of a different nature and 
they operated in areas of jurisdiction of the three separate states. As to Macedonia, the 
UN Prevention Force (UNPREDEP13) had basically the same scope of operation as the 
former one: monitoring and preventing threats to peace and stability in Macedonia.14 In 
1997, in the aftermath of developments in Albania, the UN decided to reduce the con-
tingent, which might on the one hand have testified to the opinion among international 
diplomats that the situation in Macedonia was stable and not aggravated, while on the 
other hand that it feared that the conflict might spread further to other regions inhabited 
by Albanians. Albanian people taking over weapon arsenals might have had tragic effects 
escalating the Kosovo problem and then the problem might have moved to Macedonia.
9 Ibid., p. 297. Cf.: I. Stawowy -Kawka, ‘Mniejszości narodowe w Republice Macedonii -współczesne 
problemy’ in eadem (ed.), Miejsce Macedonii na Bałkanach. Historia, polityka, kultura, nauka, Kraków 
2005, p. 87; T. Чепреґанов, ‘Патот до независноста’ in I. Stawowy -Kawka (ed.), Miejsce Macedonii…, 
p. 20.
10 In February 1993 their number had grown to 700, whilst in 1995 it reached 1,096 troops.
11 R. Holbrooke, To End a War, New York 1998, pp. 42, 122; D. Stoilovski, La République de Macédoine…, 
p. 105. For more about the situation of the Albanian people in Macedonia see: I. Stawowy -Kawka,
‘Problem albański w Republice Macedonii’, Prace Komisji Środkowoeuropejskiej, Vol. 4 (1996), p. 81 et
sequ.; eadem, ‘Mniejszości narodowe…’, p. 85 et sequ.
12 UNPROFOR continued its mission in Croatia until March 1995 as the UNCRO (United Nations 
Confidence Restoration Operation), and in Bosnia and Herzegovina until December 1995 as the 
UNMBiH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
13 UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. At that time it was an independent 
mission under the direct control of UN bodies in New York. K.A. Annan, Prevention of Armed 
Conflict. Report of the Secretary -General, New York 2002, p. 45.
14 ‘United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. Current Peacekeeping Operations: Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/
DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm>, 22 November 2013.
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The border control covered a section of 420 km, where 24 permanent and 33 tem-
porary posts were deployed and nearly 40 patrols took place every day. After the out-
break of fighting in Kosovo in 1998, the patrols were strengthened and the border 
was monitored around the clock. In addition, the UNPREDEP cooperated with ci-
vilian agencies operating in the region, the OSCE, the European Commission’s mis-
sion and NATO, whose representatives appeared there to support Albanian interests 
in Kosovo.15 This involvement led to the war which began on 24th March 1999 with 
NATO air raids on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Nearly a month earlier – on 28th 
February – UNPREDEP ended its operation in the Republic of Macedonia because of 
China’s veto,16 opposing the extension of its mandate. Curiously enough, China which 
supported Serbia’s interests, requested the withdrawal of the Prevention Force at that 
risky moment. What is more, as early as 1998 Macedonia was the scene of border inci-
dents and explosions in various parts of the country.17 When the war began, hundreds 
of thousands of refugees were heading for Macedonia, illegally crossing the border in 
north -western areas, mostly inhabited by the Albanian minority. The flow of such 
a great number of Albanian people (approx. 360,000) threatened the stability of the 
Macedonian state, with the population of only two million, additionally aggravating 
inter -ethnic relations. No doubt, this situation had an impact on Macedonia’s accession 
to the European security organisation – Eurocontrol – as early as autumn 1998.18
NATO’S INVOLVEMENT IN STABILIZING THE SOCIAL SITUATION 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
The conflict began to escalate in 2001, and the activities of the Albanian UÇK 
(ONA)19 contributed to this. Its members were recruited from Kosovo and groups op-
erating in southern Serbia, declaring themselves to be the Liberation Army of Preševo, 
Medveđa and Bujanovac. These developments raised growing tensions in the north-
-western part of Macedonia, including assaults by armed groups. The Macedonian 
Ministry of National Defence, in cooperation with the OSCE,20 spared no effort to 
15 ‘Misje pokojowe ONZ’.
16 China broke diplomatic relations with Macedonia in January 1999 because of Macedonia’s established 
relations with Taiwan.
17 China has not acknowledged Kosovo’s independence (October 2013). С. Мирчески, Алманах на 
Република Македонија. Х ронологија 1998 -2001 година, Битола 2006, pp. 18, 22, 27, 31.
18 See: M. Donevska, ‘Approaches to Social Problem Solving…’, p. 106; С. Мирчески, Алманах на 
Република Македонија…, p. 21, see also: I. Stawowy -Kawka, ‘Porozumienie ochrydzkie z 13 sierpnia 
2001 roku’, Prace Komisji Środkowoeuropejskiej PAU, Vol. 11 (2003), p. 117; eadem, ‘Mniejszości naro-
dowe…’, p. 96; T. Чепреґанов, ‘Патот до независноста’, p. 19.
19 In Macedonia operating as ONA – Osvobodilačka Nacionalna Armija. С. Мирчески, Алманах на 
Република Македонија…, pp. 41, 66.
20 For more about the OSCE’s role, see: D. Stoilovski, La République de Macédoine…, p. 81 et sequ.; R. Bil-
ski, Łuny nad Tetovem. Macedonia i jej sąsiedzi. Zbiór reportaży 2001–2002, Warszawa 2002, p. 15.
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regain control over the situation, but regardless of the fact that government forces 
outnumbered the enemy, their operations did not bring the expected results. On top 
of that, the ONA took the northern and eastern part of the country. In this situation 
the signing of the Stability and Association Agreement by the Macedonian authori-
ties was a prudent and desirable act, in which the leading role was played by Member 
States of the EU. At the same time, the Macedonian authorities sought NATO’s as-
sistance in solving the conflict. In mid -June, President Boris Trajkovski officially 
asked NATO for help. What is more, the situation alarmed foreign diplomats, fearing 
another Kosovo. It should be noted that at the time Macedonia participated in the 
Partnership for Peace, and the NATO manoeuvres were held twice in the country: in 
1997 and in 1998.21
To prevent a civil war in Macedonia, the EU and the US sent their two representa-
tives to the country: François Léotard and James Pardew, with the mission to watch over 
the dialogue between Macedonian and Albanian political parties. At the same time the 
NATO representative, Peter Feithow, was entrusted with a crisis management mission, 
and his “shuttle diplomacy” helped to establish contact with the rebels. Prime Minister 
Ljubčo Georgievski refused to talk with the ONA, but it was argued that talks with 
Albanian politicians might have been useless because it was not the politicians but the 
rebels who had placed the country’s security at risk and presented conditions for peace. 
Incidentally, these conditions were largely in line with the postulates of Albanian poli-
ticians, and ultimately the ONA leaders agreed to respect the peace agreement known 
as the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed on 13th August 2001 (though fighting was 
still going on at that point).22
The Agreement and related additional projects were to be implemented with the 
help of NATO23, the OSCE, the EU and the US. Disarmament of the ONA and the 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement were major challenges, which also called for 
international involvement.24
The first goal was planned to be achieved in the second half of August 2001. 
The operation known as Essential Harvest was expected to continue for 45 days 
and was aimed at disarming the ONA and destroying confiscated weapons. 3,500 
NATO troops were deployed to strategic sites such as the Kumanovo area, Petrovac 
airport, the outskirts of Skopje and Krivolak base in central Macedonia. All in all, 
the operation involved 4,800 soldiers from 13 countries organised within an inter-
21 I. Stawowy -Kawka, ‘Porozumienie ochrydzkie…’, p. 114; С. Мирчески, Алманах на Република 
Македонија…, pp. 21, 32, 42 and 45; M. Carp, ‘Zażegnany dramat’, Przegląd NATO, Winter 2002, 
p. 119, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue4/polish/art2.html>, 17 October 2013, see 
also: R. Bilski, Łuny nad Tetovem…, pp. 27, 135.
22 For more on this subject, see: I. Stawowy -Kawka, ‘Porozumienie ochrydzkie…’, p. 125, ‘Makedonska 
kriza: Ni rat, ni mir’, Vreme, 2 August 2001, at <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=293671>, 
17 October 2013.
23 NATO helped to control the situation until the spring of 2001. T. Чепреґанов, ‘Патот до неза вис-
носта’, p. 19.
24 M. Carp, ‘Zażegnany dramat’.
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national brigade under British command (1,700 British soldiers participated in the 
operation).25
According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the operation should have 
resulted in collecting approximately 85,000 pieces of various weapons, 5 million pieces 
of ammunition, 9,000 assault rifles, 2,000 semi -assault rifles, 800 sniper rifles of differ-
ent calibres, 8,000 pistols, 1,500 machine guns, 20,000 grenades, 20,000 anti -personnel 
and anti -tank mines, 500 heavy anti -tank and anti -aircraft guns, 900 rocket launch-
ers, 3,000 Osa anti -aircraft sets, 300 hand rocket launchers, 150 Strzała missiles and 
100 Stinger anti -aircraft missiles. Macedonian air force flights were banned over the 
areas on which the operation had been completed, withdrawing armament, tanks and 
howitzers.26
Ultimately, the operation to collect weapons continued for 30 days and ended on 
the 26th of September. As a result, 3,875 pieces of armaments were confiscated and de-
stroyed. The operation was hailed as NATO’s success, but different opinions were also 
expressed, such as those published in the Serbian media, stating that the Albanians got 
rid of outdated weapons, some of which dated from the First World War.
President Trajkovski asked NATO to stay in Macedonia in order to sustain the suc-
cess achieved and support the process of change. Most troops were withdrawn, only 
a 700 -people unit under German command, called Amber Fox and launched at the end 
of September, stayed in the country (the transfer of tasks continued until December 
2001). Among the main responsibilities was to ensure the security of EU and OSCE 
observers. The planned term of mandate was one year, and the operation was followed 
by the last NATO operation – Allied Harmony. It was the follow -up of the previous op-
eration and was expected to end in April 2003, when the European Union was to take 
over the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Macedonia.
THE EU MISSION
In April 2003, the European Union took over responsibility to help stabilize the in-
ternal situation in the Republic of Macedonia. The EU’s activities in Macedonia were 
twofold: in the long term it was aimed at cooperation with the European Commission 
in carrying out reform – e.g. assistance in police reform; in the shorter term, the opera-
tions focused on some selected issues, such as the Concordia and Proxima missions.
The first was carried out under the European Security and Defence Policy using 
NATO’s means and resources according to the Berlin+ agreement of March 2003. As 
stressed by researchers, the implementation of this project was a result of the operations 
25 С. Мирчески, Алманах на Република Македонија… See also: N. Ruzin, ‘Czekając na bałkańskie-
go Big MAC -a’, Przegląd NATO. Dodatek specjalny, Summer 2003, p. 77, at <http://www.nato.int/
docu/review/2003/issue2/polish/special.html>, 17 October 2013.
26 ‘Nastavljene provokacije’, Blic, 15 August 2001, at <http://www.blic.rs/stara_arhiva/hronika/7279/
Nastavljene -provokacije>, 17 October 2013; ‘Nastradao od kamena’, Blic, 28 August 2001, at >http://
www.blic.rs/stara_arhiva/hronika/7807/Nastradao -od -kamena>, 17 October 2013.
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in the Balkans in the previous decade and the evolution of international interventions 
based on new methods of crisis management that are currently the basic element of 
the EU’s defence and security policy. The operation was expected to continue for six 
months and it actually ended on the 5th of December 2003. Its budget amounted to 
EUR 4.700 million, with the participation of 357 troops from 13 EU Member States 
and 14 from non -EU countries. The scope of the mission’s competences was adopted 
by NATO and envisaged the stabilization of the situation in the country and the super-
vision of the Ohrid Agreement’s implementation.27
Whilst the mission was still being carried out, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski 
launched another project connected with police reform then being made and the 
National Strategy for the Reform of the Police, developed by the Macedonian Ministry 
of Internal Affair in cooperation with experts from the European Union and the United 
States.28 The strategy envisaged the closing of military missions to Macedonia whilst at 
the same time leaving international representatives who would, on the one hand, help 
to continue European security policy in the region, whilst on the other hand practi-
cally support the Macedonian state in sustaining its still fragile stability. The President 
opted for this concept, as he wanted to present Macedonia as a country evolving and 
nearing stability. The EU shared this position, agreeing to grant its support to reform 
the national security sector. In addition, the EU was to deploy a police mission in 
Macedonia.29
The aim of this mission was training recruits, supporting the implementation of reg-
ulations under police reform and: the consolidation of law and order, including the fight 
against organised crime; the creation of a border police; building confidence in local police 
within the population; enhanced cooperation with neighbouring states in the field of polic-
ing, as well as consulting and monitoring the activities of medium– and high -level of-
ficials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Prominent people in the country who wanted 
to combine law and order in combating such major issues as organized crime were pa-
trons of the operation. In addition, the Macedonian police was in a difficult situation in 
view of its ethnic composition, which pursuant to the Ohrid Agreement was to reflect 
the country’s ethnic proportion, and this level has not been reached yet. Finally, the 
EUPOL Proxima mission began on the 15th of December 2003. In addition to 200 po-
licemen and women representing EU countries, the mission was to be observed by rep-
resentatives of the OSCE and the United States. This mission is considered unique be-
27 It is worth adding that the reform of the police sector began as early as 2000 through such programmes 
as the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme. M. Emerson, E. Gross 
(eds.), Evaluating the EU’s Crisis Missions in the Balkans, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
2007, at <http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1538.pdf>, 18 November 2013; Ł. Kulesa, ‘Operacje Unii 
Europejskiej w ramach europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony’, Biuletyn PISM, No. 42 (2004), 
at <http://www.pism.pl/index/?id=1aa48fc4880bb0c9b8a3bf979d3b917e>, 18 November 2013.
28 R. Woźnica, ‘Rola Unii Europejskiej w realizacji postanowień porozumienia ochrydzkiego dotyczące-
go policji’ in M. Kawka, I. Stawowy -Kawka (eds.), Tożsamość narodowa w społeczeństwie multietnicz-
nym Macedonii. Historia, kultura, literatura, język, media, Kraków 2008, p. 282.
29 The project was finally endorsed in 2004. Its implementation began in 2006. Ibid., pp. 279; 281; 
M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating…, p. 91.
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cause the EU institution joined their forces in order to assess how well the Macedonian 
police functioned and to strive to understand the needs of the country.30
As a result of the mission’s success, its mandate was extended by another year (un-
til December 2005) at the request of the Macedonian government. The scope of the 
mission’s competences was similar to that of the previous one. Additionally it included 
border control, promotion of European police standards and enhancing police coop-
eration with neighbour states. Upon the completion of both missions, 1,605 people 
were employed in the police, but it was the result of wider comprehensive activities, 
conducted after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement.31
Later, the continuation of the mandate in the same form was considered no long-
er necessary, but it was decided that police reform would be supported for six months 
by the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT). Their competencies included, first of all, 
sustaining existing achievements in stabilizing the political and social situation, imple-
menting police reform, cooperation between the police and the judiciary and putting 
mechanisms of internal control in place. In addition, the team was expected to monitor 
police operations, support the proper functioning of border control and combat organ-
ised crime, as well as to help create an efficient police service following the EU standards. 
Cooperation under bilateral agreements with international organisations, such as the 
OSCE and individual states (France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands), was also 
envisaged. The programme was intended to serve as a bridge between the police mission 
which was finally called EUPOL Proxima and the CARDS -funded programmes.32 This 
mission was different in nature from a “standard mission”. It was expected to have a real 
30 Thus, more than 20% of Albanians should serve in the police structures (so far only 6%). Following 
the Agreement, the police were to be centrally controlled, but local commandants whose candidatures 
were proposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were to be selected by local authorities. A long -term 
process of police reform was carried out in line with the reforms resulting from the Pact on Stability 
and Association. Cf. more on this subject: R. Woźnica, ‘Rola Unii Europejskiej…’, p. 279; M. Emerson, 
E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating…, p. 92.
31 In the years 2001–2004, in cooperation with the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the 
OSCE conducted training for 1,812 officers on how to serve in an multi -ethnic police force. For 
more see: R. Woźnica, ‘Rola Unii Europejskiej…’, pp. 281, 285; ‘Council Joint Action 2004/789/
CFSP of 22 November 2004 on the extension of the European Union Police Mission in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA)’, Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 348/40 (2004), p. 2 et sequ., at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_348/
l_34820041124en00400044.pdf>, 20 November 2013.
32 In the training of recruits, representatives of the European Union closely cooperated with the OSCE. 
In view of its nature, the mission was – according to the Macedonian authorities – oriented to re-
form rather than stability, it was not considered – argues Beata Przybylska -Maszner – not a mission 
but rather as a means leading to access to financial programmes of the CARDS type. B. Przybylska-
-Maszner, ‘EUPAT – policyjny zespół doradczy w Byłej Jugosłowiańskiej Republice Macedonii’, p. 250, 
at <https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/jspui/bitstream/10593/3344/1/241–258.pdf>, 15 October 
2013; ‘Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU 
Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)’, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 307/61 (2005), at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
oj/2005/l_307/l_30720051125en00610064.pdf>, 15 October 2013; D. Stoilovski, La République 
de Macédoine…, p. 95.
326 Politeja 4(30)/2014Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska
impact on the progress of reforms in the police sector, inter alia, by the production of 
monthly reports to the Macedonian government. The structure of the programme was 
also different as it was directly accountable to the Special Representative.33
In June 2006, EUPAT’s tasks were taken over by the Twinning Project – the 
European Commission’s project of cooperation between the public administrations of 
EU Member States with selected candidate countries. In 2005, Macedonia received the 
status of official candidate, but in the Commission’s opinion reforms and transforma-
tion of the police were still needed.34
SUMMARY
The military and police peacemaking and social stability missions called for multi-
-dimensional activities of the international community. It needs to be stressed that in par-
allel with military and police operations, aid programmes, e.g. of the Council of Europe, 
the EU and EU and OSCE, bilateral aid programmes of individual countries (France, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands)35 were carried out in order to help the transformation 
of many public institutions and state legislation, adjusting them to EU standards. As re-
gards the problematic national issue, theoretical ideas of the functioning of a multiethnic 
state were followed, though in the case of Macedonia satisfying the needs of the country’s 
largest – Albanian – minority was at stake. Paradoxically, the Ohrid Agreement was signed 
without considering the interests of the Macedonian state and with complete disregard of 
the Agreement’s impact on the country’s internal security, assuming that the entry of the 
Ohrid Agreement into force would automatically improve the Albanians’ attitude to the 
Macedonians and their readiness for sustained cooperation in social harmony.
Military and police operations in the Republic of Macedonia have been assessed as 
successful. Undoubtedly, stopping the escalation of the armed conflict and reaching 
compromise thanks to international mediation was the missions’ success. However, the 
greatest contribution to peace was the Macedonian government’s willingness to endorse 
the compromise solution, as they conceded to adjusting their policy to the postulates 
of the country’s largest national minority. It needs to be stressed that the change was 
not generally supported by Macedonia’s citizens; nor were the Albanians fully satisfied, 
at least some of them. So the question arose as to whether cooperation of both nations 
33 All the more so that the Special Representative also represented the European Commission and was 
generally in charge of managing the EU’s aid. B. Przybylska -Maszner, ‘EUPAT – policyjny zespół do-
radczy…’, pp. 251, 253.
34 European Commission, ‘Twinning’, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/twinning/>, 21 November 2013; European Commi-
ssion, ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlarge-
ment Negotiations, at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed -country -information/
former -yugoslav -republic -of -macedonia/index_en.htm>, 21 November 2013.
35 The OSCE came to Macedonia in 1992. P. Olszewski, Stosunki Macedonii…, pp. 15, 17, see also: 
M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating…, p. 103.
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in the spirit of mutual understanding and respect was viable in the long term. Anyway, 
the compromise Ohrid Agreement had to be implemented under the supervision of 
the military, observers and representatives of international police forces from around 
the EU. What is more, local media showed their mistrust of international military and 
police missions, which suggested that the Macedonians feared that international diplo-
macy would take the Albanian side as was the case with Kosovo. On the other hand, 
the Albanians might fear attempts at disarming them without satisfying their requests, 
though the Kosovo case showed that they might try to reach their goals using various 
methods, including armed rising, without any consequences, and to actually succeed.
The Macedonian case shows that the implementation of the international commu-
nity’s (i.e. leading international actors engaged in crisis resolution) objectives largely 
consisted of spreading propaganda of success, putting the military and police opera-
tions in a positive light, but without taking into account potential long -term social is-
sues. The Essential Harvest operation may serve as an example in this respect; it aimed 
to confiscate 85,000 pieces of weapons from ONA armed groups but in fact less than 
4,000 were collected.36
It should also be noted that EU politicians use European aspirations of such coun-
tries as Macedonia to force these countries to follow a policy on which allegedly the 
pace of the accession process would depend. Macedonia does not have such powerful 
patrons, as, for example, Croatia, so no help came to ease the restrictive nature of such 
instruments. Unfortunately, the word of mouth praising the country’s Europeanization 
and modernization has not translated into any tangible actions allowing the country to 
meet its Euro -Atlantic aspirations. What is more, such praises might turn out incom-
patible with the actual policy. This was the case of Macedonia: in 1999 it was called 
a country of democratic change, whilst two years later it was announced that its con-
stitution and legislation should be revised, as they did not meet the desired standards 
regarding the minority policy.37
According to Isabella Iannides, thanks to the implementation of the above-
-mentioned missions and programmes, Macedonia developed legal institutions at the 
regional and national levels which made it possible to depoliticize and decentralize 
such institutions, considering their ethnic aspect. However, is it nothing more than 
a positive assessment of the implementation of programme ideas, irrespective of their 
actual application and functionality? For example: would not decentralization of the 
Macedonian authorities raise fears that self -government of ethnic groups might lead to 
the disintegration of the state from within? The EUPAT programme may be given as 
an example here: according to Beata Przybylska -Maszner it was reform -oriented rather 
than focused on stabilizing the social situation.38
36 ‘NATO stiže u Makedoniju’, Blic, 23 August 2001, at <http://www.blic.rs/stara_arhiva/hronika/7551/
NATO -stize -u -Makedoniju>, 25 November 2013; N. Ruzin, ‘Czekając…’
37 M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating…, p. 113.
38 B. Przybylska -Maszner, ‘EUPAT – policyjny zespół doradczy…’, p. 251; M. Carp, ‘Zażegnany dramat’; 
M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating…; R. Woźnica, ‘Rola Unii Europejskiej…’, p. 279; P. Olszew-
ski, Stosunki Macedonii…, p. 27.
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However, the problem lay not in the lack of or disrespect of legislation, but the 
reluctance to cooperate with another ethnic group, which has been a serious issue 
throughout the entire Balkan region. Albanians have not fully used the pool of po-
lice jobs available to them because they are reluctant to take a job in this sector, which 
is rather telling, in view of the fact that the country’s unemployment rate is as high as 
30%. This shows the motivation behind their revolt of 2001, which may be considered 
to be aimed at receiving tools to become more independent from the Macedonians 
than striving for equal rights in order to co -govern the country.39
Curiously enough, in 2006 some Albanian deputies opposed the passing of the reso-
lution. The Act was prepared not only by the Ministry but also by international advi-
sors in order to meet European standards. Rafał Woźnica writes that Albanian DUI-
-PDP politicians suggested that the mayors associated with that political group might 
break their cooperation with the police – a serious warning, considering the fact that 
they were leaders of 15 out of 16 communities with an Albanian majority.40
In November 2012, the Macedonian Parliament passed a new Act on the securi-
ty sector, containing the controversial provision stating that the Head of the Public 
Security Office would be authorized to carry out surveillance and tapping without 
the approval of the judiciary. It raised the indignation of the Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights in Macedonia, which stated that this policy was a tacit transition to the 
police state. In reply to these words, the Police Minister Gordana Jankulovska denied 
the accusations that the Act broke human rights and freedoms, indicating that Croatia 
which accessed the EU in July 2013 passed similar regulations.41
In view of the Macedonian case one can conclude that the promotion of EU standards 
and the adjustment of national legislation have taken part of the nation’s Constitution-
-based sovereignty to satisfy ethnic minorities’ claims, but it has not brought the expected 
result – i.e. harmonious co -existence in the spirit of inter -ethnic respect, understanding 
and cooperation. This is probably what European politicians have in mind talking about 
the dysfunctions of the model of a multiethnic society. In its law -making and security 
policy -making, the EU spared no effort to create the necessary instruments to bring about 
the smooth functioning of a multi -ethnic society within a democratic country. The prob-
lem is that the actors involved are reluctant to use such instruments or consciously use 
them contrary to their original ideas. Paradoxically, though the EU enforces the standards 
of minority policies on its Member States, these are not completely respected in Western 
Europe. What is more, in practice they do not even satisfy their initiators.42
39 P. Chajęcka, ‘Macedonia: Stopa bezrobocia spadła do 30,6%’, Balkanistyka.org, 18 December 2012, at 
<http://balkanistyka.org/macedonia -stopa -bezrobocia -spadla -do -306/>, 20 November 2013.
40 R. Woźnica, ‘Rola Unii Europejskiej…’, p. 282.
41 S.J. Marušić, ‘Macedonian Police Law Creating “Police State”, Watchdog Says’, Balkan Insight, 16 
November 2012, at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/watchdog -shuns -new -macedonian-
-police -law>, 11 November 2013.
42 Participants in the missions to Macedonia mentioned their frustration resulting from their limited 
mandate, which sometimes prevented them from providing real help (whether through consultancy 
or action). M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating…, pp. 95, 102.
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Thus, the answer to the research question is rather ambiguous. One can ar-
gue that thanks to international involvement, relations between Macedonians and 
Macedonian Albanians in Macedonia have been stabilized in terms of de -escalation 
of the armed conflict. However, ethnic relations have not improved in terms of rec-
onciliation and tolerance in the spirit of inter -ethnic cooperation to achieve common 
goals, such as the good of the common state and the country’s development towards 
attaining European standards in order to bring Macedonia closer to integration with 
the European Union.
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